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THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS’ DEFLATING 
HOPE: THE LANHAM ACT SURVIVES THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE   
 
HAMMAD RASUL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 18, 2014, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) cancelled the registration of 
the trademarks for the Washington Redskins.1 Five Native-American petitioners 
brought the cancellation proceeding pursuant to section 14 of the Lanham Act 
of 1946.2 The Washington Redskins have since appealed the trademark  
cancellations to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of  
Virginia.3 In its appeal, the Washington Redskins argued that “the trademark 
board ‘improperly penalized the Washington Redskins based on the content of 
the team’s speech in violation of the First Amendment.’”4 The TTAB did not 
address the First Amendment argument because, as an administrative  
tribunal, it does not have the authority to rule on the constitutionality of the 
Lanham Act.5    
Under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, a trademark can be cancelled if the 
trademark is disparaging and brings people, institutions, beliefs, or national 
symbols into contempt or disrepute.6 Section 14(c) of the Lanham Act allows 
                                                 
*Graduated cum laude from the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law and he 
earned his B.A. from the University of Maryland, College Park. The Author is grateful to his mother, 
Rana Rasul, and his sister, Afia Rasul, for their unwavering love, support, and encouragement. 
1. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (Lexis) 1080, 1082 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
2. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2014)). 
3. Erik Brady & Megan Finnerty, Washington Redskins Appeal Decision to Cancel Trademark, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/redskins/2014/08/14/wash-
ington-redskins-appeal-federal-trademark-registrations/14066527/. 
4. Id.  
5. Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1082–83; see also Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(Lexis) 1828, 1833 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (citing Panola Land Burgers Ass’n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550 (11th 
Cir. 1985); McGowan v. Marshall, 604 F.2d 885, 892 (5th Cir.1979); Finnerty v. Cowen, 508 F.2d 979, 
982 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
6. § 1052(a).  
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any person who believes he or she is, or will be, damaged by a trademark to file 
a petition to cancel registration of the trademark that includes claims of  
disparagement and disrepute.7 Courts have held that a trademark will be  
cancelled if a substantial composite of the population finds the mark disparaging 
or offensive.8 However, the Washington Redskins filed an appeal, in which it 
argued that cancelling the trademarks under sections 2(a) and 14(c) of the  
Lanham Act violates the First Amendment,9 which states, “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”10  
Determining the constitutionality of the Lanham Act requires exploring and 
resolving the intersections of various bodies of First Amendment law. However, 
determining the constitutionality of the Lanham Act also raises several  
questions. For example, whether trademark registration falls within the realm of 
commercial speech, and if so, can the speech be restricted? Whether the Lanham 
Act provides a governmental benefit, and if so, can the government regulate the 
speech when it provides such a benefit? On its surface, the First Amendment 
may seem to hold sections 2(a) and 14(c) of the Lanham Act unconstitutional. 
However, the grey areas within the intersections of various First Amendment 
doctrines allow the government to regulate the expressive content of  
trademarks, such as the Washington Redskins.  
Part II provides a background on the history of the commercial speech  
doctrine, section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, and of the current litigation. Part III.A 
discusses whether the government is able to restrict speech under the  
commercial speech doctrine. Part III.B discusses whether trademarks are a form 
of government benefit that allows the government to regulate their expressive  
content. Part III.C argues that trademarks are within the non-public forum, 
thereby increasing the government’s regulatory power to restrict speech. Part 
III.D compares the speech regulation under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act with 
government-issued, custom license plates to argue that governmental regulation 
of the content of trademarks is permitted.  
                                                 
7. § 1064.  
8. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (citing In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 
327, 329 (C.C.P.A. 1938)). 
9. See Brady & Finnerty, supra note 3 (“The team release says that the trademark board ‘improperly 
penalized the Washington Redskins based on the content of the team's speech in violation of the First 
Amendment’ . . . .”). 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Development of Commercial Speech  
The purpose of the Lanham Act is to give federal protection to  
trademarks to protect a trademark producer and consumers in the marketplace.11 
Rather than creating any new federal rights, the Lanham Act drafters merely 
codified the common law of trademarks.12 Historically, trademarks were  
initially used as a way for merchants to identify their own goods to claim them 
if the goods were lost in transit.13 In “the first reported trademark decision by an 
English common law court,” the court in Sykes v. Sykes awarded an injunction 
to the plaintiff because the defendant used the plaintiff’s trademark on the  
defendant’s products.14 Sykes is one of the earliest examples of limiting speech 
in favor of regulating the marketplace.15  
Congress did not address any First Amendment issues when enacting the 
Lanham Act in 1946 because First Amendment protections did not extend to 
commercial speech until decades later.16 In 1942, the Court in Valentine v. 
Chrestensen held that commercial speech was not protected by the First  
Amendment.17 The Court gave no other reasoning in upholding the city  
ordinance that prohibited distribution of any advertisement in or upon any 
street.18 In 1951, the Court in Breard v. City of Alexandria reaffirmed the 
Chrestensen ruling that First Amendment protections do not extend to  
                                                 
11. H.R. REP. NO. 79-219 (1945); see also Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Founders’ Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp. 787, 792 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (“Today, a trade-mark performs a three-fold 
function: (1) to indicate origin; (2) to guarantee; and (3) to advertise and sell. . . . Today, the trade-mark 
still serves to indicate origin, but the identity of the origin is often unknown to the consumer. The mark 
merely indicates to him that goods bearing the mark come from the same origin, whatever that origin 
may be.”).  
12. Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 520 
(1993); see also In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879) (holding unconstitutional the  
trademark legislation that imposed criminal penalties against those who produced or consumed coun-
terfeited trademarks).  
13. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1839, 1849 (2007) (“Producers relied on identifying marks, for example, to demonstrate ownership of 
goods recovered at sea.”). 
14. Id. at 1853 (citing Sykes, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B.)).  
15. See id. at 1853 n.46. 
16. Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How 
Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 36 (1994). 
17. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint 
on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”). 
18. Id. at 54–55. 
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commercial speech.19 Breard upheld a law that prohibited merchants from  
soliciting business door-to-door.20 However, the Court reasoned that it was the 
“commercial feature[s]” of the activity that upheld the law, preventing salesmen 
from going door-to-door.21 The Court added that under the First Amendment, 
the law could not prohibit “the press or oral advocates of ideas” from soliciting 
door-to-door.22  
It was not until Bigelow v. Virginia in 1975 that commercial speech  
received First Amendment protection.23 The Court struck down a Virginia law 
that made it a crime to advertise procuring an abortion.24 The Court reasoned 
that just because the advertisement in the newspaper had commercial aspects, 
the commercial aspect of the speech in itself “did not negate all First  
Amendment [protection].”25  
The Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia  
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. made clear that commercial speech receives 
First Amendment protection.26 The Court struck down a Virginia law that  
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices, fees, discounts, and  
premiums of any prescription drugs.27 The Court reasoned that “speech which 
does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’28 is [not] so [far]  
removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’29 and from ‘truth, science, morality, 
and arts in general’30 . . . that it lacks all protection.”31 Further, the Court  
reasoned that advertisements may be “tasteless [or] excessive,” but they still 
disseminate important information as to who is producing and selling what 
product.32 The Court expanded on the reasoning that the dissemination of  
                                                 
19. See 341 U.S. 622, 644–45 (1951). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 642. 
22. Id. at 641. 
23. 421 U.S. 809, 828–29 (1975).  
24. Id. at 812–13, 829 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1– 63 (1960)) (“If any person, by publication, 
lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner,  
encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 
25. Id. at 818 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110–111 (1943)) (“The State was not 
free of constitutional restraint merely because the advertisement involved sales or ‘solicitations.’”). 
26. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
27. Id. at 771. 
28. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
29. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
30. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
31. Id.  
32. Id. at 765. First Amendment protection of commercial speech is provided in situations such as 
this, where prices of prescription drugs are unpredictable, because not extending First Amendment  
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information in a free-flow commercial economy can be used to form intelligent, 
and work to enlighten, decision-making in a democracy.33 However, the Court 
limited the First Amendment protection by excluding any commercial speech 
that is “false or misleading.”34  
The Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public  
Service Commission of New York35 set forth a four-part test analyzing  
government restrictions on commercial speech. The Central Hudson test asks 
whether (1) the speech at issue “concern[s] lawful activity and [is]  
not . . . misleading”; (2) “the asserted governmental interest is substantial”; and, 
if both are answered affirmatively, (3) “the regulation directly advances the  
governmental interest asserted[;] and” (4) the regulation “is not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.”36 Thus, as long as the commercial 
speech is not misleading and addresses a lawful activity, it is entitled to receive 
First Amendment protection.37  
B. The History of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act 
The TTAB previously refused registration for other trademarks, such as for 
a cigarette company seeking to name its product “Senussi” because the  
Senussi-sect of the Islamic faith forbids smoking.38 The TTAB refused the 
trademark by holding “that ‘[t]he application of the name of any religious order 
or sect to a product whose use is forbidden to the followers or adherents of such 
sect or order is an affront to such persons and tends to disparage their beliefs.’”39 
In 2010, the TTAB refused the trademark sought by the Lebanese Arak  
Corporation when it sought to trademark “KHORAN.”40 The TTAB found the 
term disparaging because the alcoholic product to be trademarked could be  
                                                 
protection creates more of an inconvenience to the general public than it serves a governmental interest.  
Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 771.  
35. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
36. Id. 
37. See id. at 564 (“If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the 
government's power is more circumscribed.  The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved 
by restrictions on commercial speech.  Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that 
interest.  The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.”). 
38. Pace, supra note 16, at 28 (citing In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. 
(Lexis) 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959)). 
39. Id. at 28–29 (alteration in original) (quoting Reemtsma, 122 U.S.P.Q. at 339).  
40. In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (Westlaw) 1215, 1215–16 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 4, 2010). 
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perceived as a misspelling of the Islamic holy book, the Koran.41 The TTAB 
further found that the general public would take the trademark to mean the  
sacred book of Islam, rather than the Armenian term “altar.”42 The TTAB  
reasoned that even if it accepted the Armenian term, the radio advertisements 
would pronounce the alcoholic beverage “Koran,” which would disparage a 
substantial composite of the Muslim population.43 
Finally, just because a trademark may be self-disparaging, it still will not 
receive trademark protection if it offends a “substantial composite” of the  
subgroup being disparaged.44 One such example is when the TTAB denied the 
African-American comedian Damon Wayans from trademarking the word 
“NIGGA” for his entertainment services company.45 
C. A Brief History of the Case-at-Large 
In 1966, the Washington Redskins filed for trademark protection for “the 
Redskins,” which was granted in 1967 without opposition from any  
Native-American groups.46 “In 1992, Suzan Shown Harjo and six other  
Native-Americans . . . petitioned the TTAB to cancel the [Redskins]  
trademarks” in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo.47 It was not until 1999 that the 
TTAB ruled in favor of the Native-American petitioners and cancelled the 
Washington Redskins trademarks.48 In holding for the petitioners, the TTAB 
explained that federal trademarks have a presumption of validity.49 Therefore, 
the petitioners had the burden of proving disparagement.50 The TTAB held that 
                                                 
41. Id. at 1216 (“[T]he Koran is the sacred text of Islam [and] the Koran forbids consumption of 
alcoholic beverages, including wine; and therefore that the use of KHORAN for wine is disparaging to 
the beliefs of Muslims.”).  
42. See id. at 1219. 
43. Id. at 1220. 
44. Francine Ward & Stephanie Quick, Offensive Marks: The Policing of Trademarks in a Diverse 
World, LANDSLIDE, Mar.–Apr. 2013, at 52, 53. 
45. Id.  
46. Mark S. Nagel & Daniel A. Rascher, Washington “Redskins”—Disparaging Term or Valuable 
Tradition?: Legal and Economic Issues Concerning Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 17 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 792–93 (2007). 
47. 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D.D.C. 2003); Nagel & Rascher, supra note 46, at 793. 
48. 284 F. Supp. 2d at 100. 
49. Id. at 123 n.24 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 20:64 (4th ed. 1997)). 
50. Id. at 122; see also Pace, supra note 16, at 51 (“If Petitioners can prove that the ‘Redskins’ 
trademark can reasonably be understood to refer to them as Native Americans and that reasonable  
Native Americans or a substantial composite of Native Americans could have found the mark  
disparaging in 1967 when registration was issued, then the ‘Redskins’ trademark should be cancelled.”). 
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the petitioners met the burden of proving disparagement, because the trademark 
was used with a pictured logo of a Native-American.51 In 2003, a district court 
found that the TTAB erred in finding there was sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the name “Redskins” was disparaging to Native Americans.52 Furthermore, 
the court held that the best time to resolve the case would have been shortly after 
1967, when the Washington Redskins trademarks were initially granted.53 The 
court ruled in favor of the Washington Redskins in granting the defense of 
laches and held that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the  
trademarks.54  
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed and remanded the case back to the district court, holding that the  
defense of laches applied to all but one petitioner, who was only one-year-old 
when the trademarks were filed, and therefore, was the only petitioner with 
standing.55 The court of appeals based its holding on the defenses of laches, not 
on the central issue of disparagement.56 As a result, in 2006, a new petition was 
filed involving younger Native-American petitioners who had recently reached 
the age of majority, as determined by the holding of the court of appeals.57  
Blackhorse testified in front of the TTAB in March of 2013.58   
At the conclusion of Harjo, six new individual petitioners filed a petition to 
cancel the same registrations for the Washington Redskins trademarks.59 In June 
of 2014, TTAB once again cancelled the Washington Redskins trademarks, 
finding that the trademarks were disparaging towards the Native-American 
community.60 Among other evidence, the TTAB relied heavily on a resolution 
                                                 
51. Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 126–27.  
52. Id. at 144 (“The findings do not come close to shedding any light on the legal inquiry. There is 
no evidence in the record that addresses whether the use of the term ‘redskin(s)’ in the context of a 
football team and related entertainment services would be viewed by a substantial composite of Native 
Americans, in the relevant time frame, as disparaging.”). 
53. See id. at 142 (“The Court finds that constructive and actual notice on the part of Defendants, 
widespread use of Pro–Football's trademarks, and the over twenty-five years that have passed since first 
notice of the mark, accompanied by an insufficient excuse from Defendants for their delay, requires 
this Court to find undue delay on the part of Defendants.”). 
54. Id. at 145. 
55. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 49–50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
56. See id.  
57. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (Lexis)1080, 1114 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
58. Erik Brady, New Generation of American Indians Challenges Redskins, USA TODAY (May 
10, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/redskins/2013/05/09/native-americans-washing-
ton-mascot-fight/2148877/ (“No matter how it is decided, appeals are likely, and the case could go on 
for years, as it did the first time.”). 
59. Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1084. 
60. Id. at 1082. 
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passed by the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) in finding that 
the trademarks were disparaging towards Native-Americans.61 The TTAB  
reasoned that circumstances surrounding the NCAI’s resolution painted a fair 
representation of a substantial composite of the Native American population 
that found the trademarks disparaging.62 For example, the NCAI resolution  
referred to several dictionary definitions of the word “Redskin” during the  
relevant time frame of 1967 through 1990 and found that several dictionaries 
defined the term as “Often Offensive” or “Slang (often disparaging and  
offensive).”63 Additionally, the NCAI found wide usage of the term in various 
media sources prior to the late 1960s when the Washington Redskins acquired 
the trademark protection.64  
III. ANALYSIS 
The government restricts “false or misleading” speech under the  
commercial speech doctrine.65 Therefore, cancelling the Washington Redskins 
trademarks for being disparaging towards Native Americans is unconstitutional 
if viewed solely under the doctrine of commercial speech.66 The constitutional 
rule has long held that the government cannot “forbid particular words” to  
censor offensive speech.67 However, the government has greater power to  
regulate speech when the government provides subsidies68 and the speech is in 
                                                 
61. See id. at 1110–11. 
62. Id. at 1098 (“[T]he circumstances under which the resolution was passed, i.e., that approximately 
150 tribes were represented by NCAI at that time and at least one third of the tribal members were 
present to pass the resolution.”). 
63. Id. at 1093 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1204 (1967); 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1618 (2d ed. 1987)). 
64. Id. at 1095–98.  (“Merrit Meets the Enemy. Victory over our Frontier Foes. Thirty-Seven  
Redskins Sent to the Happy Hunting Grounds. The Indian Problem Reaching a Conclusion. . . . ‘Fort 
Wicked’ Too Tough for Redskins . . . Headline from Rocky Mountain News (October 21, 1931). ‘Good 
luck, get a redskin for me.’ Excerpt from the 1940 movie Northwest Passage.  ‘There is reason in her 
words!’ at length broke from his compressed and trembling lips; ‘ay, and they bear the spirit of  
Christianity; what might be right and proper in a redskin, may be sinful in a man who has not even a 
cross in blood to plead for his ignorance.’”). 
65. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
66. See id. at 770, 771–73 (providing the various forms of speech that can be regulated by the  
government under the commercial speech doctrine, of which, disparaging or scandalous speech is not 
listed).  
67. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption 
that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the 
process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient 
guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.”). 
68. See infra Part IV.  
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the non-public forum.69   
 A. Government Restrictions on Trademarked Speech Does Not Pass the 
Central Hudson Four-Part Test 
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act forbids trademarks that are offensive,  
scandalous, and disparaging, such as the Washington Redskins.70 However, 
such governmental restriction must pass the Central Hudson four-part test for 
the government to restrict speech on trademarks under the commercial speech 
doctrine.71 The first prong requires that the speech at issue concerns a lawful 
activity and is not misleading.72 The Washington Redskins trademarks are  
affiliated with lawful activities of a football team in the National Football 
League.73 Additionally, although trademarks in general have the potential to 
confuse consumers, the Washington Redskins use of the trademarks is not used 
to mislead consumers in the marketplace.74 As such, section 2(a) of the Lanham 
Act fails the first prong of the Central Hudson four-part test and prevents the 
government from restricting speech through the commercial speech doctrine. 
However, other First Amendment principles work together and allow the  
government to restrict offensive and disparaging trademarks under section 2(a) 
of the Lanham Act.  
B. When the Government Provides Trademark Protections or Other 
Government Benefits, the Government Can Restrict Content-Based Speech  
Although trademarks, like those for the Washington Redskins, are privately 
owned, the government subsidizes trademarks through federal registration.75 In 
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,76 the Supreme Court upheld a  
requirement that the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA) consider standards 
of “decency and respect” for Americans’ diverse beliefs and values when  
                                                 
69. See infra Part V. 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2014). 
71. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  
72. Id.  
73. See Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of Redskins?, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 665, 682 (2000). 
74. Id.  
75. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1367 (2001) 
(“Because the government provides assistance to private speech as private speech, the constitutional 
values that allow the government great discretion in choosing the content of its own speech do not 
apply.”). 
76. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
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selecting grant recipients for arts.77 The NEA was created in 1965 and “has  
distributed over $3 billion in grants to individuals and organizations” to promote 
the arts.78 The NEA was provided with broad discretion to award grants, as its 
only requirements were to ensure “‘artistic and cultural significance, giving  
emphasis to American creativity and cultural diversity,’ ‘professional  
excellence,’ and the encouragement of ‘public knowledge, education,  
understanding, and appreciation of the arts.’”79 In 1990, the National  
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act was amended to “establish[] 
procedures to judge the artistic merit of grant applications, to ‘tak[e] into  
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs 
and values of the American public.’”80  
The Court rejected a challenge to the 1990 amendment over the basis that 
the adoption of the “decency and respect” clause did not allow the NEA to deny 
funding for viewpoint discrimination.81 The Court further explained that  
“‘decency and respect’ criteria do not silence speakers by . . . ‘threaten[ing] 
censorship of [any particular] ideas.’”82 Finally, the Court reasoned that when it 
comes to government subsidies, the government regulates speech “according to 
criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a  
criminal penalty at stake.”83  
The Court in Finley cited R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul84 to provide an example 
of where the government recognized the permissibility of content discrimination 
when speech restriction does not run the danger of discriminating against an 
idea or viewpoint.85 The Supreme Court in R.A.V. found that if the reason for 
content discrimination is neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class 
of speech, then the same reason must also be “neutral enough to form the basis 
of distinction within the class.”86 The Court provided an example illustrating 
                                                 
77. Id. at 572–73.  
78. Id. at 574.  
79. Id. at 573 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(c)(1), (3), (5) (2013)).  
80. Id. at 576 (alteration in original) (quoting § 954(d)(1)).  
81. Id. at 581.  
82. Id. at 583 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992)).  
83. Id. at 587–88.  “Congress may ‘selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it 
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which 
seeks to deal with the problem in another way.’” Id. at 588 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
193 (1991)).  
84. See generally 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
85. Id. at 388. “When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason 
the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint  
discrimination exists.” Id. 
86. Id.  
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that “[a] State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most 
patently offensive in its prurience—i.e., that which involves the most lascivious 
displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit, for example, only that  
obscenity which includes offensive political messages.”87  According to the 
Court, restricting speech is permitted when an entire class of speech is restricted, 
rather than just specific elements within a larger class of speech.88  
In its appeal, the Washington Redskins may argue that section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act violates R.A.V.’s rationale in that section 2(a) restricts only those 
elements of commercial speech that are disparaging or offensive.89 In R.A.V., 
the St. Paul statute restricting speech stated: 
 
[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol,  
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but 
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one 
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm 
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,  
religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.90 
 
The Washington Redskins could further argue that the statute in R.A.V.  
operated similarly in restricting speech as section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.91 The 
Washington Redskins argument against section 2(a) of the Lanham Act would 
be that both the St. Paul statute in R.A.V. and section 2(a) operate similarly to 
restrict speech when such speech is used to offend a group of people. However, 
there is a key distinction between the language used in the St. Paul statute and 
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act that sets the two apart.   
The Court in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. 
Southworth92 held that the government must maintain viewpoint neutrality when 
restricting speech through content discrimination.93 Southworth held that  
mandatory student fees at a public university were constitutional because the 
                                                 
87. Id.  
88. Id. 
89. See id. at 387 (“Even the prohibition against content discrimination that we assert the First 
Amendment requires is not absolute.  It applies differently in the context of proscribable speech than in 
the area of fully protected speech.”). 
90. Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).  
91. See id.; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2014). 
92. See generally 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
93. See id. at 221. 
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university maintained viewpoint neutrality.94 The University of Wisconsin  
“required full-time students . . . to pay a nonrefundable activity fee,” which was 
“segregated from the University’s tuition charge.”95 The fees were collected to 
maintain a fund supporting the extracurricular activities of many of the  
university’s student organizations.96 The parties in Southworth stipulated that 
“‘[t]he process for reviewing and approving allocations for funding is  
administered in a viewpoint-neutral fashion,’ and that the University does not 
use the fee program for ‘advocating a particular point of view.’”97 The students 
challenging the university’s student activity fees argued that “the University [of 
Wisconsin] must grant them the choice not to fund those [student organizations] 
that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to their personal 
beliefs.”98 The Court held that the fees were permissible so long as the funds 
collected from the fees were administered in a viewpoint-neutral manner.99  
Finley, R.A.V., and Southworth illustrate situations where the government 
can regulate speech based on its content, so long as the restriction is viewpoint 
neutral. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act allows any trademark to be cancelled if 
it is offensive, scandalous, or disparaging.100 The Washington Redskins will 
surely argue that a cancellation of its trademarks under section 2(a) is viewpoint 
discrimination.101 However, as illustrated in R.A.V., there is little risk of  
viewpoint discrimination when content discrimination is not tied to any  
particular group based on creed, race, religions, or gender.102 Section 2(a) of the 
                                                 
94. Id. (“The First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used 
to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral.”). 
95. Id. at 222.  
96. Id.   
In the University's view, the activity fees “enhance the educational experience” of its students by 
“promot [ing] [sic] extracurricular activities,” “stimulating advocacy and debate on diverse points of 
view,” enabling “participa[tion] in political activity,” “promot[ing] student participa[tion] in campus 
administrative activity,” and providing “opportunities to develop social skills,” all consistent with the 
University's mission.  
Id. at 222–23 (alterations in original). 
97. Id. at 224 (alteration in original).  
98. Id. at 227.  
99. Id. at 233 (“The proper measure, and the principal standard of protection for objecting students, 
we conclude, is the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support.”). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2014). 
101. C.f. Eugene Volokh, Patent & Trademark Office Cancels Several Washington Redskins  
Trademarks, WASH. POST (June 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2014/06/18/patent-trademark-office-cancels-several-washington-redskins-trademarks/ (“An 
exclusion of marks that disparage groups while allowing marks that praise those groups strikes me as 
viewpoint discrimination.”). 
102. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 391 (1992). 
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Lanham Act requires that regardless of the viewpoint represented, any  
trademark will be cancelled if it is scandalous, offensive, or disparaging.103   
C. The Government Can Restrict Speech in Non-Public Forums to Dissociate 
Its Speech from Private Speakers   
The government does not engage in viewpoint discrimination when “it has 
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”104 Rust v.  
Sullivan upheld the constitutionality of denying family planning funds to private 
parties who engage in abortion counseling.105 The Supreme Court in Rust  
reasoned that “the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; 
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”106 Rust 
distinguished the government subsidizing certain programs or entities from the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.107 Unconstitutional conditions occur 
when “the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy 
rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the 
recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the  
federally funded program.”108 Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act does not place a 
condition on the recipient of a trademark, but instead imposes that trademarks 
may not be issued for content that is offensive, scandalous, or disparaging.109 
Applied to the Washington Redskins, the government would not require the 
Washington Redskins to change its name to receive a trademark but instead  
requires that the TTAB not issue trademarks that it deems inappropriate.   
As illustrated by Southworth, when the government speaks, “it can choose 
what to say.”110 To serve the interests of its citizens, the government “can  
discriminate in its own speech against unpopular ideas or modes of expression 
that are constitutionally protected when privately uttered.”111 Trademarks,  
however, fall between protected private speech and unprotected government 
                                                 
103. § 1052(a). 
104. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).  
105. Id. at 178.  
106. Id. at 193.  
107. Id. at 197.  
108. Id.  “Congress has merely refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc, and the Secretary 
has simply required a certain degree of separation from the Title X project in order to ensure the  
integrity of the federally funded program.” Id. at 198.  
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2014). 
110. Jacobs, supra note 75, at 1358 n.11 (citing Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.  
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 833 (1995)).  
111. Id.  
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speech.112 When speech falls between the realm of private and government 
speech, the question of regulating such speech is decided by whether the speech 
occurs in a public forum or a non-public forum.113 “[A] public forum . . . [is a] 
government designat[ed] . . . place . . . of communication for use by the public 
at large for assembly and speech . . . .”114 As the public forum is created for the 
purposes of exchanging ideas, the government cannot restrict speech without a 
compelling governmental interest.115 In Widmar v. Vincent,116 a public forum 
was created when the state university had an express policy of making its  
meeting facilities available to student groups.117 As such, the university could 
not exclude specific groups from using the facilities for religious purposes.118  
Just as “[t]he First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply 
because it is owned or controlled by the government,” a public forum is only 
created when there is clear evidence that the government intended to create 
one.119 A non-public forum is where the government creates a private speech 
forum, allowing the government “to discriminate among [certain] types of 
speech.”120 Regulating “access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject 
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”121  
Therefore, in a non-public forum, the government is allowed to restrict the  
content of particular speech, so long as the government does not suppress  
individual viewpoints.122  
In the non-public forum, the government unusually conditions the access to 
private speakers by setting “standards such as the speech being in good taste, 
decent, not controversial or not offensive. Often the standards forbid specific 
types of speech, such as those which pertains [sic] to sexual conduct, are  
                                                 
112. See id. “Between the extremes of private speech and government speech lies the vast middle 
ground of government/private speech interaction. This type of interaction occurs in the many instances 
where the government subsidizes private speech by allocating funds or property access to support it.” 
Id.  
113. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).  
114. Id. at 814. 
115. Id. at 800.  
116. See generally 454 U.S. 263 (1981).  
117. Id. at 277. 
118. See id. at 267.  
119. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 
453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)).  
120. Jacobs, supra note 75, at 1359.  
121. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.  
122. Id. 
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derogatory toward particular groups, disparage a deity, or relate to an  
intoxicating substance.”123  Typical examples of non-public forums “include 
‘vanity’ license plate[s] . . . advertis[ements] in public spaces, and art displays 
in public places.”124 
The Supreme Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights125 upheld the city’s 
decision to deny advertising space on city buses to political candidates running 
for office.126 “When [the] petitioner [in Lehman] applied [to advertise on a city 
bus], he was informed . . . that, although the space was then  
available . . . the city did not permit political advertising.”127 However, the city 
did allow “ad[vertisement]s from cigarette companies, banks, savings and loan  
associations, liquor companies, retail and service establishments, churches, and 
civic and public-service oriented groups.”128 The Ohio Supreme Court found 
that even though the city allowed advertisements on its city buses, there was no 
violation of equal protection “because, [a]s a class, all candidates for political 
office are treated [equally] under the . . . advertising policy.”129 The Supreme 
Court found that it was constitutional for the city to engage in content  
discrimination by disallowing any political advertisement in non-public forums, 
so long as the city was not engaged in viewpoint discrimination.130 Like the 
petitioners in Lehman, the Washington Redskins could argue that similar to  
advertisement space on city buses, trademarks “constitute a public forum  
                                                 
123. Jacobs, supra note 75, at 1360–61 (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 
1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 1998); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Dep’t 
of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. Mass. Bay Transp. 
Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1994); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendering, 954 F. Supp. 
1099, 1100 (D. Md. 1997); Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230, 1232, 1235 (E.D.N.C. 1993); 
Kahn v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Jean Godden, Foolin’ 
State on Your Plate NOEZTSK, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995, at B1; Frank J. Prial, Wine Talk, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 1997, at C8)). 
124. Id. at 1361.  
125. See generally 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
126. Id. at 299–300, 304.  
127. Id. at 300.  
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 301.  
130. See id. at 303–04. 
 
Because state action exists, however, the policies and practices governing access to the 
transit system's advertising space must not be arbitrary, capricious, or invidious.  Here, the 
city has decided that “[p]urveyors of goods and services saleable in commerce may  
purchase advertising space on an equal basis, whether they be house builders or butchers.”   
 
Id. (quoting Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 296 N.E.2d 683, 685 (Ohio 1973)).  
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protected by the First Amendment, and that there is a guarantee of  
nondiscriminatory access to such publicly owned and controlled areas of  
communication ‘regardless of the primary purpose for which the area is  
dedicated.’”131 Just as the city engaged in issuing advertisement space, the  
government must make “managerial decision[s]” when issuing trademarks.132 
The Supreme Court in Lehman held that the government’s managerial decision 
to use innocuous and less controversial content in its non-public forum did not 
violate the First Amendment.133  
When issuing trademarks, the government is engaged in regulating a market 
of goods to ensure that consumers are not confused or misled.134 The non-public 
forum in the context of trademark law is open for trademark owners to have 
their goods protected by the government. The government creates a non-public 
forum when it issues trademarks and allows trademark owners to attach the  
government stamp on their products.135 In doing so, the government has greater 
leeway to discriminate content that is in bad taste, disparaging, controversial, or 
offensive.136 Therefore, the government does not violate the First Amendment 
by choosing not to assign trademarks to the Washington Redskins.  
In Claudio v. United States,137 the Eastern District Court of North  
Carolina upheld the government’s decision to revoke a permit that allowed the 
plaintiff to display his painting in a federal building.138 The painting was taken 
down because it contained a larger-than-life, frontal image of a nude female, 
accompanied by a realistic depiction of a human fetus, umbilical cord, and  
placenta.139 Upon unveiling the painting, the field office manager of the federal 
building notified Claudio that his license was revoked and removed the  
painting.140 Claudio argued that “any person is entitled by the United States 
Constitution to exhibit in any manner designated by anyone as ‘art,’ any  
rendition of any subject, idea or issue in or on any federal building.”141 Further, 
                                                 
131. Id. at 301. 
132. See id. at 304.  
133. Id. (“Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries, office  
buildings, military compounds, and other public facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open 
to every would-be pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does not require.”). 
134. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).  
135. See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1679 (2010).  
136. Jacobs, supra note 75, at 1361–62.  
137. See generally 836 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.N.C. 1993). 
138. Id. at 1237. 
139. Id. at 1232. 
140. Id. at 1233.  
141. Id. at 1234.  
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Claudio relied on Cohen v. California142 where the Court held “the Government 
could not prohibit [Cohen] from wearing [his] jacket [in the courtroom, which 
read] ‘Fuck the Draft.’”143 Therefore, Claudio argued that he could display his 
painting in the federal building.144 However, the district court distinguished 
Claudio from Cohen by holding that the plaintiff’s shirt in Cohen could only be 
attributed to the plaintiff himself, whereas in Claudio, people would associate 
the painting with the government.145  Similarly, a government trademark gives 
the perception that the government endorses such speech,146 and as such, the 
government can set the standards of what speech to trademark, so long as the 
standard remains viewpoint neutral.   
D. The Government’s Ability to Restrict Speech on Vanity License Plates Is 
Analogous to Its Ability to Restrict Speech on Trademarks 
In Claudio, the non-public forum was a setting where the government acted 
as a proprietor.147 Vanity license plate programs are more comparable to Section 
2(a) of the Lanham Act, because in both situations, the government acts as a 
licensor, rather than a proprietor.148 Vanity license plates are vehicle license 
plates that allow a vehicle owner to choose a combination of letters or words to 
display on their license plates instead of a randomly chosen license plate  
assigned by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).149 For example, in  
Vermont, “a vehicle owner may obtain vanity plates by paying an additional  
fee . . . .”150 However, many states reject requests for vanity plates with words 
that are offensive or objectionable in anyway.151 Similarly, Section 2(a) of the 
                                                 
142. See generally 403 U.S. 15 (1971).  
143. Claudio, 836 F. Supp. at 1234.  
144. Id.  
145. See id. at 1234–35 (“In the instant case, the offensive expression literally was physically  
attached to the courthouse itself, and it was so large and situated in such a location that anyone entering 
the Federal Building had to look at it.”) (emphasis in original). 
146. Trademark FAQs, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp#_Toc275426682 (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2015) (“You may only use the federal registration symbol ‘®’ after the USPTO  
actually registers a mark, not while an application is pending.”) (emphasis added). 
147. Claudio, 836 F. Supp. at 1237. 
148. See Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 167–69 (2d Cir. 2001). 
149. See id. at 163.  
150. Id.  
151. See, e.g., Registration – Specialty Plates, MVA, http://www.mva.maryland.gov/About-
MVA/INFO/27300/27300-29T.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2015) (“The [Maryland] MVA reserves the 
right to decline a requested message because . . . it is objectionable”); Restrictions on Personalized 
Plates, N.Y. ST. DMV, http://dmv.ny.gov/custom-plates/restrictions-personalized-plates (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2015) (New York restricts vanity license plates that are “obscene, lewd, lascivious, derogatory 
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Lanham Act also requires that a trademark be rejected if it is offensive or  
objectionable to the public.152 
In Perry v. McDonald,153 the Second Circuit held that the government can 
restrict speech on vanity license plates by finding that vanity license plates are 
within the non-public forum.154 Perry requested vanity license plates that read 
“SHTHPNS.”155 Vermont initially issued the vanity license plates but later  
revoked the plates upon discovering that “SHTHPNS” stood for “Shit  
Happens.”156 Vermont revoked Perry’s vanity license plates and found them  
offensive to the general public under the Vermont statute.157  In upholding  
Vermont’s decision, the Second Circuit reasoned that vanity license plates fall 
within the non-public forum because Vermont did not intend to use vanity  
license plates to create a public forum open for discourse.158  
The Second Circuit provided several reasons illustrating that Vermont did 
not intend to create a public forum.159 One such reason provides that  
Vermont’s policy in issuing license plates (including vanity license plates) “is 
to aid in vehicle identification,” rather than opening a public forum intended for 
public discourse.160  Additionally, the Second Circuit reasoned that “the general 
public does not have [full] access to Vermont license plates, including vanity 
plates[, in that] only Vermont vehicle owners who have obtained permission to 
do so may place a message of their choice on their vanity plate.”161 Given these 
reasons, the Second Circuit found the Vermont statute denying offensive terms 
on vanity license plates constitutional.162 Similarly, Congress passed the  
Lanham Act to “provide[] federal protection for distinctive marks that are used 
                                                 
to a particular ethnic or other group, or patently offensive.”).  
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2014). 
153. See generally Perry, 280 F.3d 159.  
154. Id. at 169, 172–73.  
155. Id. at 163.  
156. Id. at 164.  
157. Id. (“[T]he Vermont statutes empowers the Commissioner of the DMV to ‘refuse to honor any 
request [for special plates] that might be offensive or confusing to the general public.”) (alteration in 
original). 
158. Id. at 167 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985)) (“The government ‘does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited  
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.’”). 
159. Id. at 167–69. 
160. Id. at 167. 
161. Id. at 168 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804) (“[G]overnment property remains a nonpublic 
forum ‘when it does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of 
speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, obtain permission to use it.’”). 
162. Id. at 175.  
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in commerce.”163 Additionally, individuals-at-large do not have unfiltered  
protection under trademark law unless an individual first obtains permission 
from a reviewing attorney at the PTO.164  
The Second Circuit in Perry also found that Vermont had authority to  
restrict speech on vanity license plates as a means of disassociating itself from 
a private party’s message on a vanity license plate.165 The Second Circuit  
reasoned that “[a]lthough the owner of a vehicle chooses the characters that  
appear on a vanity plate, the Vermont DMV must approve of a vanity plate  
before issuing it.”166 As a result, the Second Circuit found that Vermont “ha[d] 
a legitimate interest in not communicating the message that it  
approves . . . offensive . . . terms.”167 Vanity license plates and trademarks are 
first approved by the government, and in both instances, it would be  
unreasonable to associate private speech on vanity license plates and in  
trademarks as the government’s speech. 
The Utah Supreme Court decision in McBride v. Motor Vehicle Division of 
Utah State Tax Commission is illustrative of the parallel in the government’s 
ability to restrict speech on vanity license plates and section 2(a) of the Lanham 
Act.168 Utah prohibits terms “that may carry connotations offensive to good taste 
and decency or that would be misleading.”169 In McBride, the Native American 
petitioners “object[ed] to the use of the term ‘redskin’ on Utah license plates.”170 
The vanity license plate owners argued that they are fans of the Washington 
Redskins and “the only reason they requested the plates was to show their  
support and admiration for that team.”171 The petitioners testified that based on 
their personal experiences, “the term ‘redskin’ . . . is offensive and derogatory 
to them personally, to their families, and to all Native Americans.”172 The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and held that if a reasonable 
person finds the vanity license plates offensive, Utah may revoke the use of 
                                                 
163. Trademark, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/trademark (last visited Dec. 
14, 2015) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2014)). 
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a).  
165. Perry, 280 F.3d at 169–70 (citing Gen. Media Commc’ns., Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d, 273, 281 
n.10 (2d Cir. 1997)).  
166. Id. at 169. 
167. Id.  
168. See generally 1999 UT 9, 977 P.2d 467. 
169. Id. ¶ 3 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1a-411 (West. 1996)).  
170. Id. ¶ 2. 
171. Id. ¶ 5. 
172. Id.  
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those license plates.173 However, the Utah Supreme Court did not address the 
First Amendment constitutionality of the state’s right to restrict speech on  
government-issued license plates.174  
In March of 2015, the Supreme Court heard arguments on the legality of the 
Texas specialty license plate program.175 A specialty license plate program  
provides individuals with a variety of license plate designs and offers “drivers 
willing to pay an extra fee . . . a ‘specialty’ plate containing a specialized design 
or message.”176 Specialty license plates differ from vanity license plates, in that 
specialty license plates allow individuals to design the entire license plate that 
others individuals can purchase;177 whereas, vanity license plates allow one  
individual to customize his or her letters or numbers used on the license plate to 
identify the vehicle registration.178  
In the Walker III v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. oral 
argument, the Supreme Court sought an answer to whether the government had 
an interest in regulating speech on specialty license plates.179 According to  
Stephen Baird, there are “five . . . substantial government interests served by 
denial of” offensive and disparaging trademarks.180 These interests are  
“preventing the [trade]marks from: (1) carrying the imprimatur of the federal 
government, (2) receiving the support of public funds, (3) being the subject of 
exclusive ownership, (4) having their use encouraged through the trademark 
registration scheme, and (5) interfering with the public's health and welfare.”181 
Similarly, Corey Brettschneider and Nelson Tebbe argue Texas has a substantial 
interest in banning the Confederate flag, because “[Texas] wanted to avoid even 
the risk of seeming complicit in official nostalgia for the institution of  
slavery.”182  
Additionally, in Berger v. American Civil Liberties Union of North  
Carolina, the Supreme Court has been asked to decide whether North Carolina 
                                                 
173. Id. ¶ 18.  
174. See generally McBride, 1999 UT 9, 977 P.2d 467.  
175. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Walker III v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate  
Veterans, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (No. 14-144), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argu-
ment_transcripts/14-144_5i36.pdf. 
176. Id. at *4. 
177. See id. at *4–5.  
178. See Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2001). 
179. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 175, at 24.  
180. Lefstin, supra note 73, at 683. 
181. Id. at 683–84.  
182. Corey Brettschneider & Nelson Tebbe, Opinion, A License to Say Anything?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/10/opinion/a-license-to-say-anything.html?_r=0. 
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rightfully barred a specialty license plate containing the phrase “Choose 
Life.”183 However, unlike in Walker III, “there is no strong government interest 
in denying pro-choice messages. The right to terminate a pregnancy is currently 
enshrined in law; the government does not have an important interest in  
preventing citizens from advertising their existing rights.”184 However, the  
government has a strong interest in disassociating itself with offensive and  
disparaging speech that a “substantial composite of the general public” finds 
offensive.185 By content discriminating against offensive and disparaging 
speech, the government is able to disassociate itself with such speech.186  
Therefore, the government has an interest in disassociating itself from the  
Washington Redskins, because the government found the team’s name  
offensive to the substantial composite of the Native American population.  
Conversely, no strong governmental interest exists in denying a trademark like 
the Philadelphia Eagles because the substantial population does not find the 
speech offensive.187   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the commercial law doctrine prevented challenges to section 2(a) 
of the Lanham Act at its inception, the Lanham Act still survives First  
Amendment challenges. The government’s protection to trademarked products 
provides a governmental benefit to private parties, which thereby allows the 
government to engage in content-based discrimination. Additionally, the  
government has greater power to regulate speech when it occurs in a non-public 
forum. When the government does not open a forum for speech and does not 
want private speech to be associated with it, the government has the authority 
to restrict speech. The primary purpose of the Lanham Act is to ensure stability 
in the goods and services market. Trademark law is not a forum created by the 
government for the sole purpose of expression. Trademarks’ similarity with 
vanity license plates, for which the government allows content-based speech 
restriction, provides strong reasoning that section 2(a) of the Lanham Act will 
survive the constitutional challenges by the Washington Redskins.  
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